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LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
he has expressed the view that it is for Congress, not the Court,
to decide how far a state may go in regulating interstate com-
merce if such regulation is not discriminatory.3 5 Has he relin-
quished this view by his asquiescence in this decision?
In conclusion, it is easy to formulate the proposition that a
state tax on interstate commerce is valid if it is on a separable,
local incident and invalid if on an inseparable, integral part of
the commerce. The difficulty arises when this abstract proposition
is applied to a concrete case, and one is called upon to decide
whether the object of the tax in question is separable or insepar-
able, local or national in scope. Reasonable minds can well differ
as to when the object becomes inseparable from, and a direct part
of, interstate commerce, for in making that determination it is
easy to point out distinctions where they apparently do not exist.
James M. Dozier, Jr.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-INTER-GOVERNMENTAL TAXATION-
IMMUNITY FROM STATE SALES TAX OF CONTRACTORS
UNDER "COST-PLUS-A-FIXED-FEE" CONTRACTS
WITH THE UNITED STATES
Two tractors to be used in the construction of a government
project were purchased by private contractors as "purchasing
agents for the Government."' An Arkansas "gross receipts" tax2
was levied on the sale and paid by the contractor's vendor under
protest. The plaintiff vendor alleged that the tax was, in effect,
a tax on the federal government and therefore invalid. The
Arkansas Supreme Court upheld the'tax.8 On appeal to the
35. Gwin, White & Prince, Inc. v. Henneford, 305 U.S. 434, 452 (1939):
"Congress is the only department of our government-state or federal-
vested with authority to determine whether 'multiple taxation' is injurious
to the national economy ......
Id. at 455: "I would return to the rule that-except for state acts
designed to impose discriminatory burdens on interstate commerce because
it is interstate-Congress alone must 'determine how far [interstate com-
merce] . . . shall be free and untrammelled, how far it shall be burdened by
duties and imposts, and how far it shall be prohibited.' [Welton v. Missouri,
91 U.S. 275, 280 (1875).]"
1. Kern-Limerick, Inc. v. Scurlock, 74 Sup. Ct. 403, 409 (1954).
2. Ark. Gross Receipts Tax Act of 1941, ARK. STAT. §§ 84-1901, 84-1902(e),
84-1903, 84-1908 (1947).
3. Parker v. Kern-Limerick, Inc., 254 S.W.2d 454 (Ark. 1953). The
Arkansas Supreme Court relied on Alabama v. King & Boozer, 314 U.S. 1
(1941), holding that the legal incidence of the tax fell on the private con-
tractor. When the incitdence, which refers to the specific person or agency
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United States Supreme Court it was held that the contractor was
acting as an agent for the government and was exempt from the
tax. It was held further "that the purchaser under this contract
was the United States,"'4 and that the tax was invalid because its
legal incidence was on the government and not on the private
contractor. Kern-Limerick, Inc. v. Scurlock, 74 Sup. Ct. 403 (1954).
The doctrine of strict inter-governmental tax immunity is
traceable to the opinion of Chief Justice Marshall in McCulloch
v. Maryland.5 This immunity was originally extended to salaries
of federal and state officials, exempting them from income taxes
of both the state and national government. 6 This principle that
"a tax on income is a tax on its source" was later reversed.7
The strict immunity doctrine was held to cover a munici-
pality's purchase of police motorcycles,8 a veterans hospital's
purchase of gasoline on which was levied a state sales tax,9 and
the storage and withdrawal of government-owned gasoline.10 The
most notable exception, or "loophole," made by the Court was
the sanctioning of a West Virginia gross receipts tax on a private
contractor under employ of the government. Here, the Court
declared that a non-discriminatory tax, not placed directly on a
governmental agency, was valid."
taxed, falls on a private contractor in a "cost-plus-a-fixed-fee" contract, the
tax is valid even though the economic burden is ultimately borne by the
government, said the Court.
4. 74 Sup. Ct. 403, 410 (1954).
5. 4 Wheat. 316 (U.S. 1819). There the Court held that Congress' power to
create a national bank implied the power to preserve it, and the state tax
on the bank was held invalid as an encroachment of the sovereignty of the
United States.
6. Collector v. Day, 11 Wall. 113 (U.S. 1870), held invalid a federal income
tax on the salary of a state judge; New York ex rel. Rogers v. Graves, 299
U.S. 401 (1937), in which the salary of a railroad official employed by the
government was held exempt from state income tax.
7. Graves v. New York ex rel. O'Keefe, 306 U.S. 466 (1939) overruled the
Day case, cited note 6 supra, and made ineffective other strict Immunity
cases.
8. Indian Motorcycle Co. v. United States, 283 U.S. 570 (1931).
9. Panhandle Oil Co. v. Mississippi, 277 U.S. 218 (1928). This case was
limited and questioned by James v. Dravo Contracting Co., 302 U.S. 134
(1937), and Alabama v. King & Boozer, 314 U.S. 1 (1941), respectively.
10. Graves v. Texas Co., 298 U.S. 393 (1936). This case was limited and
questioned by the James and King & Boozer cases, note 9 supra.
11. James v. Dravo Contracting Co., 302 U.S. 134 (1937). Cf. Oklahoma
Tax Commission v. Texas Co., 336 U.S. 342 (1949), in which the Court held
that non-Indian lessees on Indian reservations are not immune to state tax
on gross production of oil. This case affirms Helvering v. Producers' Corp.,
303 U.S. 376, 387 (1938), which overruled Gillespie v. Oklahoma, 257 U.S. 501
(1922).
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The James v. Dravo Contracting Co. 12 decision was the start-
ing point of the "transition period" of tax immunities; the Court
had begun to lift the taxing ban on the states in regard to private
contractors employed by the government. The peak of this
transition was reached, in 1941, in Alabama v. King & Boozer.'
3
Here the Court held that the state sales tax was valid despite the
fact that the economic burden was on the government 4 because
the purchasers were private contractors, and the legal incidence
of the tax fell on them and not on the United States. "[The con-
tractors] were not relieved of the liability to pay the tax either
because the contractors, in a loose and general sense, were acting
for the Government in purchasing the lumber or, as the Alabama
Supreme Court seems to have thought, because the economic
burden of the tax imposed upon the purchaser would be shifted
to the Government by reason of its contract to reimburse the
contractors.' 5 The Court has consistently prohibited the assess-
ment of taxes directly on governmental agencies,' 6 but has
recently allowed a tax on the storage of government-owned gaso-
line in Tennessee."
It has been the Court's recent tendency to uphold taxes on
private "cost-plus" contractors even though the economic burden
has been borne by the government, if Congress has failed to
exercise its right to grant express immunities.' s The govern-
ment's self-assuiied burden has been met by a "hands-off"
12. 302 U.S. 134 (1937). See note 11 supra.
13. 314 U.S. 1 (1941).
14. The Court was satisfied to look only to see where the legal incidence
of the tax fell. In the "cost-plus" contracts, the tax is added to the contract
price so that the employer (the government in this case) actually bears the
burden of the tax.
15. Alabama v. King & Boozer, 314 U.S. 1, 12 (1941). The King & Boozer
case questioned Panhandle Oil Co. v. Mississippi, 277 U.S. 218 (1928) and
Graves v. Texas Co., 298 U.S. 393 (1936).
16. Cf. Mayo v. United States, 319 U.S. 441, 447 (1943), holding invalid a
state fee upon a federal government agency's inspection of fertilizer: "These
inspection fees are laid directly upon the United States." (Italics supplied.)
17. Esso Standard Oil Co. v. Evans, 345 U.S. 495 (1953). This case distin-
guishes and strictly limits the case of United States v. County of Allegheny,
322 U.S. 174 (1944), where a property tax was held invalid as applied to
government-owned machinery under lease to the "taxpayer" because the
property was a measure of the tax. In the Esso case the tax was upheld
because it was levied solely on the privilege of storing.
18. See Carson v. Roane-Anderson Co., 342 U.S. 232 (1952), wherein the
Tennessee sales and use taxes were held invalid as applied to government
contractors working on an atomic project. The Atomic Energy Act of 1946
[60 STAT. 765 (1946), 42 U.S.C. § 1809(b) (1946)] expressly exempted such con-
tractors' purchases from state taxation, and provided for lump sum payments
to the states in lieu of the taxes.
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policy' 9 on the part of the Court, and its effect has been to pre-
vent impairment of the states' taxing power.20
The majority opinion distinguished the King & Boozer case
which was held not controlling since in that case, though the
government also bore the economic burden, the legal incidence
of the tax involved was held to fall on the independent con-
tractor.21 In the present case the legal incidence of the tax is on
the government since a Navy purchase order was used, making
the government the purchaser. In effect, however, the contractor
was granted this immunity in the present case because the Court
desired to relieve the government of the economic burden, a
factor that has been ignored by the Court for many years.
Undoubtedly this new immunity doctrine will meet with no
small amount of criticism, especially among the states where
large government projects are under construction.
In the instant case, the dissenting opinion 22 questioned the
power of a government agency to re-delegate government spend-
ing to a private contractor without authorization by Congress.
It maintained that the United States was not the purchaser of the
tractors within the meaning of the Arkansas statute23 and could
not render the contractor immune from the tax.24 The dissenters
felt that the King & Boozer decision could not be distinguished,
and therefore should be followed.
25
It seems that the Court, as a matter of policy, is altering the
19. Court usually found the tax valid unless it fell directly on the govern-
mental agency (see note 14 supra), or had been expressly rendered inap-
plicable to certain government employees (see note 18 supra).
20. See Esso Standard Oil Co. v. Evans, 345 U.S. 495 (1953), 102 U. OF PA.
L. REV. 241.
21. 74 Sup. Ct. 403, 411 (1954). The King & Boozer decision was further
distinguished in that the Court held in that case that the contractor was not
an agent of the government. Id. at 409. In the present case, it was held that
the contractor was the government's agent and thus was exempt from state
taxation.
22. 74 Sup. Ct. 403, 412 (1954) (Douglas, J., with whom Warren, C.J., and
Black, J., joined.
23. "No doubt the United States was, under some of the language used
in King & Boozer, the 'purchaser' of these two tractors. But the United
States is not the 'purchaser' under the language used in the Arkansas stat-
ute, and it is the Arkansas statute that controls this case." Id. at 413.
24. The dissent held that the legal incidence of the tax fell on the private
contractor despite the contract between the latter and the government which
allegedly makes the contractor an agent for the government.
25. "State of Alabama v. King & Boozer and the cases it followed [James
v. Dravo Contracting Co., 302 U.S. 134 (1937) and Graves v. New York ex rel.
O'Keefe, 306 U.S. 466 (1939)] were a long step forward from the time when a
State's power to tax was nullified whenever the federal treasury was even
remotely affecLed. We should not take this equally long step backwards."
74 Sup. Ct. 403, 413 (1954).
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decade-old trend of allowing the states to levy sales taxes indi-
rectly on the government, through private contractors, when
such action has not been expressly prohibited by congressional
action.26 The implication of the instant decision is that the Court
will examine state taxes to determine where the economic bur-
den ultimately lies. The legal incidence fiction seems to have
been in effect abandoned, at least for the present time. The dis-
senting opinion refers to the majority opinion as a "long step
backwards,' 27 but there is no definite indication that the Court
has re-established a variation of the old strict immunity doc-
trine.
The present decision does place a certain limitation upon
state taxation of private individuals' purchases when made for
use in fulfilling government contracts. Thereby, it is possible for
the government to deprive the states of substantial revenues by
employing private contractors as purchasing agents and impart-
ing to them the government's immunity from state taxation. In
the event there is too great a burden imposed on the states by
this latter practice, the Court might well offer a remedy by
reverting to the legal incidence principle.
It is submitted that this decision is questionable since it
insufficiently distinguished the King & Boozer case. Even if the
majority opinion were justified in distinguishing this case, it is
evident that the Court has imposed a substantial limitation on
the states' taxing power by granting immunity from state taxa-
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The purchaser of a home from a subdivision developer
brought action against the contractor's surety, alleging non-
completion of the building contract and defective work. His
action was based on .the combined recordation of the contract
and surety bond between the vendor and the contractor. The
district court found no privity of contract between the purchaser
26. Congress may grant express immunity to private contractors in its
employ. See note 18 supra.
27. See note 25 supra.
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